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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VIRGILE. NORTON,

Appellant,

vs.

DEPARTl\ilENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, AND BOARD
OF REVIE~r OF THE INDUSTRIAL CO.MMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents.

Case No.
11292

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter arises under the Utah Employment
Security Act wherein the appellant seeks to recover
unemployment compensation for a period of time when
he was unemployed. Compensation was denied him by
the respondents on the basis that he was a full time student, pursuant to the provisions of 35-4-5 (g), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by the Session Laws
of 1963.

I

DISPOSITION OF CASE BY
AD.l\iINISTRATIVE AGENCY
This is an appeal from a judgment and order hold.
ing that the appellant was a full time student at the
time of his discharge from his employment, and there.
fore was not entitled to recover unemployment corn.
pensation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Board of Re·
view's decision in this matter, and an award to the appel·
lant of compensation as provided by law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant had been employed full time as a
painter for Trane Company from August 8, 1966, to
January 19, 1968 (R-15). In this endeavor, he was
earning approximately $440.00 per month, and had
during the year 1967 earned a total income of $5,229.52
(R-16).
In addition to being employed by Trane Company
as a painter, the appellant concurrently attended 'Vest·
minster College at various times as a full time student,
pursuing his college work in the mornings and continu·
ing his full time occupation as a painter in the after·
noons, he having worked the afternoon shift at Trane
Company throughout the entire period of time that he
was employed.
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During the year 1966, Mr. Norton, the appellant,
while still engaged as a full time painter, attended a fall
semester at '"'" estminster College, which semester ran
through the month of January, 1967 ( R-16) . At the
termination of this semester, he was compelledto leave
his educational endeavors because of reasons of health.
He did, however, continue his occupation as a painter,
and worked through the entire year until January of
1968, when he was discharged for "reduction in force"
by his employer (R-15). The appellant had returned
to 'Vestminster College in the fall semester of 1967,
and carried a full course of instruction from September,
1967, through January of 1968 ( R-17) .
On the basis that Mr. Norton was a full time student, the Department of Employment Security denied
him unemployment compensation and this action was
affirmed by the Board of Review (R-6, 23, 29). The
appellant took all necessary steps to perfect his appeal
to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Board
of Review, and this matter is now properly before the
Supreme Court for review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY AND THE BOARD OF REVIE"\V
IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE LA \V OF
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE FACTS OF
TUE CASE.
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One of the disputes between appellant and respond.
ent is whether or not Section 35-4-5 (g), Utah Codt
Annotated, 1953, as amended by the Session Laws ol
1963, is applicable under the facts of the instant case.
This section of Utah law states:
"5. An individual shall be ineligible for bene.
fits or for purposes of establishing a waitini
period:

(g) for any week in which he is registeren
at and attending an established school, or i
on vacation during or between successive quar.
ters or semeters of such school attendance
unless the major portion of his wages for in·
sured work during his base period was fOJ
services performed while attending school,
provided, however, that notwithstanding tht
provisions of this subsection an otherwise eli·
gible individual shall not be ineligible to re·
ceive benefits while attending night school,~ s
part time training course, or a course approvea n
by the Commission ; and provided further that v
satisfactory attendance and satisfactory prog·
gress in a course approved by the Commissior
shall be evidence of availability."

There is no dispute of the fact that the appellant ha~
0
been engaged as a full time painter at Trane Compan/
tc
from September, 1966, through December 31, 1961. ti
The fact that he did upon occasion attend W estminste1
h
College as a full time student does not in any war
It
detract from or change his status as a full time enl'
,
a Ul
ployee under the "\Vorkmen s Compensation Act, an
in particular under the unemployment provisions there
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of. Had he not been attending 'Vestminster College
during the Fall of 1967, this dispute would not have
arisen, nor can the respondent say that he would not
have been entitled to unemployment benefits upon his
involuntary termination in January of 1968, from his
full time employment.

The fact that he was attending Westminster College for the fall semester does not change his status
as a full time employee. It is submitted that because he
ren
'ii was in fact a full time employee, otherwise entitled to
ar- unemployment benefits, the mere entering of a school
ce. on a full time basis, while still maintaining his status
m
as a full time employee, does not bring him within the
fm
purview of 35-4-5 (g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
101,
tht as amended.
~Ii·

re·

It is submitted that the purposes and intent of this

·e

However, these are not the facts before the Court

section of the Utah law was to exclude from unemployment compensation privileges, students who merely
1al
worked part time or for several months a year while
1g·
or they pursued their normal course of education, normally
working only during the summer months. It is easy to
see that many abuses had arisen prior to the enactment
of this act, or could have arisen where a student, going
nr
)1.
to the college on a full time basis, would work during
;el the summer months to earn enough money to go back
ar to school, and because of his termination of his employn· rnent after summer employment then be entitled to
,a unemployment compensation.
5

today. The appellant in this case was in fact a bona
fide full time employee who had earned in excess of
$5,000.00 from his employment during the calendar
year involved. The mere fact that he desired to return
to college full time while still maintaining his full time
employment does not in any way throw him into the
category of a full time student. The fact that he saw
fit to try to enhance his future earning capabilities by '
obtaining a college education by performing not only
full time employment but likewise going to \Vestminster College on a full time basis does not change his
basic status of a full time employee.
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts i
the appellant, even though he was attending a college
or school on a full time basis, was still a full time em·
ployee and not under the purview or the intent of Section 35-4-5 (g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as ·
amended.
r

1

The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Ken·
necott Copper Employees, et al, v. Department of Em·
ployment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P.2d 987, stated:
"The Employment Security Act was designed
to ease the burdens of unemployment and multi·
various evils which ramify from it. I ts primary
purpose is to assist the worker and his family
in times when, without fault on his part, he is out
of work. The secondary purpose is to provide
stability for the general economy by assuring
continuing of purchasing power."
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In light of the Supreme Court's announcement of the
aims of the Employment Security Act, it is abundantly
clear that the section of law relied upon in denying
appellant his rights to unemployment security are not
applicable.

POINT II
SECTION 35-4-5 (g), IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST
APPELLANT.
Section 35-4-5 ( g) contains the following language:
"(g) * * * That notwithstanding the proviof this subsection, an otherwise eligible individual shall not be ineligible to receive benefits
while attending night school, a part time training
course or a course approved by the Commission;
sion~

* * *"

It is submitted that the language of the Legi~lature
in exempting night school but not day school where
it does not conflict with a person's employment is discriminatory and contrary to the Constitution of Utah
and the Constitution of the United States.

Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution of Utah,
provides that there shall be equal protection and benefits afforded to the citizens of the State of Utah, and
it is respectfully submitted that 35-4-5 (g) does not
comply with equal protections to the citizens as it discriminates against whether a person attends day school
or night school, and has the effect of depriving one
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who is attending day school from rights under the
Unemployment Compensation Act, but affords coverage to those who attend night school although their
situations may be identical, the facts of the case differing only as to the time of attendance and not to the
extent or to any other factor. Likewise Section 35-4-5
(g) offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In the case of IJ-'I cGowan v. Mary land ( 1961 ) , 366
US 420, 6 L.ed 2d 393, 81 S.Ct 1101, it was held:
"Although no precise formula has been developed, the court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides the states a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which effect some
groups of citizens differently than others. The
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the state's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted with their
constitutional power despite the fact that in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statu·
tory discrimination will not be set aside if any
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it." (Citing Cases)

1

.
•

.
·

In a more recent case, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Rinaldi v. Yeager ( 1966), 384 US 305, 16
L.ed 2d 577, 86 S.Ct 1497, stated:
"The equal protection clause requires more. of '
the state law than nondiscriminatory application
within the class it establishes. (Citing Cases) It
also imposes a requirement of some rationalit~·
in the nature of the class singled out. To be sure.
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the constitutional demand is not a demand that a
statute necessarily apply equally to all persons.
The constitution does not require things which
are different in fact to be treated in law as though
they were the same. (Citing Cases) Hence legislation may impose special burdens upon defined
classes in order to achieve permissable ends. But
the equal protection clause does require that, in
defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have some revelance to
the purposes for which the classification is made."
(Citing Cases)
It is submitted that in this day and age of manufacturing companies and concerns commonly working two
and three 1)hifts a day, it is immaterial whether or not
a person is employed full time at night and desires
to go to day school, or whether he is employed full time
during the day and desires to go to night school. The
legislative intent of the Act in question was to promulgate the welfare of the worker and of his family.
Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees, et al, v. Department of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P.2d
987.

There is no rational basis for singling out an employee who goes to night school from an employee who
goes to day school.
In the case of Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers
(1959) 358 US 522, 3 L.ed 480, 79 S.Ct. 437, the
Supreme Court of the United States said:
"But there is a point beyond which the State
cannot go without violating the equal protection
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clause. The State must proceeed upon a rational
basis and may not resort to a classification that
is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been
stated to be that clasification must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substan.
tial relation to the object to the legislation.'"
(Citing Cases)
The constitutionality of 35-4-5 ( g) need not be
determined if the court rules that the statute is inap.
plicable as set forth in Point I above. Heathman v.
Giles, 13 U. 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839. However, if the
Court does not distinguish this case on its facts, it then
must declare this section of the Utah Law unconstitutional.
SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted that the Board of
Review has misapplied the law to the facts, or in the
alternative the law as applied is unconstitutional as it
violates the equal protection guarantees of the Utah
and United States Constitutions.

COTRO-.MANES, FANKHAUSER
& BEASLEY
By ............................................................... .
Paul N. Cotro-Manes
430 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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